Yeah in 8-12 years I think if price does not substantially increase so as to enable more miners to be profitable, and if fees remain similar to current day, then miners and pools are in for some trouble. Power law correlations are bullish for price, but also demonstrates how hashrate will grow proportionally, thereby impacting the variance for all miners and pools.
Only the strongest most efficient miners with lowest energy costs will survive, or they need to diversify their strategies to generate revenue. They must maximally squeeze all value out of their hashrate and minimise their costs to stay profitable. I also imagine further consolidation by pubcos and other large private miners that are closer to the money printer than the plebs miners.
The consolidation of hashrate and increasing regulatory scrutiny on Bitcoin does not bode well for censorship concerns. A substantial proportion of hashrate mining OFAC compliant blocks might doom Bitcoins censorship resistance, hence why innovation in this area is necessary.
More smaller independent pools that are globally distributed and ideologically leaning towards a censorship resistant Bitcoin is the only solution. Pools are trusted third parties that can be pressured by the state, so the more of them that exist in diverse jurisdictions the better.
This makes total sense. What about stratumv2 and other related solutions.
Pools would prefer to rid themselves of the regulatory risk of block templating… but not at the cost of reduced profitability for their customers. So they need some guarantees that miners will create good templates, or a way to penalize them if they don’t.
The reality is SV2 still allows the pool an opportunity to veto templates from miners anyway. So if pressured by authorities, they could still censor enough to be “OFAC compliant”.
StratumV2 is better than stratumv1 for sure, but fundamentally the pool can always reject the block templates. I think it would be good to crowdsource block template generation, and Demand pool is pushing the boundary in that regard. Giving miners the responsibility means the state needs to go after more people to enforce censorship, which can make Bitcoin more censorship resistant.
But still if the pool can reject the block template or withhold payment, they’re still trusted third parties. I don’t think this is a bad thing though. Big trustless pools open themselves up to block withholding attacks, but small trusted pools have less of an attack surface. More small trusted pools across more jurisdictions means miners have more choice, and means the state must attack more pools and miners if it tries to censor Bitcoin.
Anything that we can do to make Bitcoin more resilient should be done.
Oddbean new post about login | logout