There are still some gaps to fill. Robin wants to use this to create a federation which cannot steal your money as long as one of them is honest. Here is a design I think is close to working: the federation members would all act as verifiers who agree to challenge a prover (who holds all sidechain deposits) if he doesn't process withdrawal requests correctly.

As long as one of them does so honestly, that honest party could take the prover's money and distribute it to withdrawer's honestly if the prover does not do so.

If this design worked it would improve the trust assumptions of federated sidechains, which currently rely on an honest majority, so that instead they only rely on a single honest party -- which could be you. You could just be one of the verifiers, and then you only need to trust yourself (and bitcoin's standard trust assumptions, e.g. 51% of miners are not censoring your transactions) 

 I can't wait to read the details on how this 2wp would work.  

 Here's Paul Sztorc's response from telegram:

Paul Sztorc (beware impostor accounts):
Yeah but this only applies to the people who have sat down with each other when the chain started

New people can't join -- or if they do they are trusting the other original people

Also doesn't solve the lopsided fee problem

And, as always, 51% hash can steal via censorship -- but no strength in numbers effect for BitVM 2wp

So I doubt people will use BitVM for 2wp