That looks like exactly what I described, no? The trick is which peers are selected. Do you preselect them before losing your key?
Pensando aqui, se houvesse uma forma de manter, durante a criação de uma nova chave, os peers que seriam os certificadores desta chave, um golpista não poderia tentar burlar o processo porque teria que convencer os peers originalmente definido durante o processo de criação da própria chave. O risco seria para quem ainda não o fez (processo de transição atual) ou para quem pula esta etapa do processo. Desta forma, o usuário pode ainda criar identidades de certificação para serem utilizadas como “e-mails de recuperação”. Um invasor, para roubar uma chave, teria que roubar várias, caso o próprio usuário decidisse certificar sua chave com suas próprias contas de certificação, ou convencer amigos do usuário atacado, caso ele delegasse esse trabalho para contas reais.
Thinking about it here, if there was a way to keep, during the creation of a new key, the peers that would be the certifiers of this key, a scammer could not try to circumvent the process because it would have to convince the peers originally defined during the creation process of the key itself. The risk would be for those who have not yet done this (current transition process) or for those who skip this stage of the process. This way, the user can even create certification identities to be used like as a "recovery emails". An attacker, to steal a key, would have to steal several, if the user decided to certify his key himself with your own certification accounts, or convince friends of the attacked user, if he delegated this work to real accounts.
This way, it would be safer to have your own certifying accounts. But as a last resort, friends are defined at the beginning of the account creation process. In the first case, he must keep these certification accounts well to use in a recovery. In the case of indicating real people, the process described above takes into account the extreme case of the subject not having created certifying accounts, or losing these keys.
Logically, all these descriptions does not apply to the nostr model in this way. But it could be applied through a multisig transaction that could only be unlocked by certification keys, and this would guarantee possession of the private key to whoever has these keys