28. Does the CSAM regulation sufficiently take into account the signals from the [police department that deals with sexual assault, CSAM and similar depressing stuff] that additional reports will not lead to a faster or more effective fight against online child abuse, because the capacity is not in order?

(i.e. they're understaffed because of a lack of budget and the fact that you can't do this work for long without losing your sanity) 

 32. How confident can you be that enabling client-side scanning on encrypted private communications will not eventually lead to its expansion to other types of material? 

 34. What is the United States' position on the CSAM regulation, which could subject its national tech sector to legal obligations that conflict with U.S. law? 

 Let me answer this one:

42. Is it possible to use technical means to exclude the possibility that a detection order will be used in the future for other types of information than child and young person sexual abuse material?

NO 

 (it was actually question 44)

45. What is the rationale behind Article 7(8)(d) which states that detection does not apply to accounts used by the State for national security purposes, maintenance of public order or military purposes?

Quod licet Iovi non licet bovi, duh. 

 50. How do you use the definition of ‘end-to-end’? And more specifically, what is the beginning and what is the end of communication? 

 60. How can lists containing details of potential or as yet unconfirmed owners of possible child pornography be prevented from ending up on the street?

(ending up in a data breach) 

 "You will have no privacy and TPTB will enjoy it" 

 Will we see the answers? I am curious. 

 Yes, the answers will be public, but probably vague and boring. 

 I love boring 

 TPTB just want to force docile compliance on the entire populous and then exterminate the majority because they're eugenicists. Do Not Comply.