My complaint is that almost all apps presume the user will always sign everything, and they usually crash or are buggy when the user does not give the app access to everything 

 this is because most front end app devs have ZERO understanding of cryptography, not even the distinction between actual encryption and signing

the media has not helped this at all, by calling signatures "asymmetric encryption" bullshit. the encryption requires you to do a little computation but signatures are not encryption they are authentication, really big difference 

 That's a corollary for sure 

 signing is a more expensive operation by like factor of 4 or more than deriving a decryption secret and making a cipher block stream

not wanting to see messages that have been encrypted to you is quite retarded, i mean, i don't even know how to express how retarded it is to not want to spend the cheapest amount of crypto compute on seeing what people send you

signing stuff, that's a different issue because implicitly you are also sending that out, there should be a clear delineation between actions that are secret and actions that become public or at least move to private across the connection

i admonish you guys to do some more study on cryptography and signals intelligence, please 

 look, put it this way, if someone has already breached your system, they can see all yoru encrypted messages and you are whining because the signer asks you to derive a shared secret???? 

 sorry but this is beyond retarded

performing an action that has zero effect outside your computer should not need any permission  

 deriving shared secrets out of a message from your nsec should not require permission at all. at all.

if someone is already inside your browser or computer that's a whole separate problem to signing stuff and sending it out, i really hope you get the distinction 

 Shared secrets gives you something durable that clients can quietly exfiltrate to spy on users later. Not a good idea IMO, but others disagree 

 if they can get at the shared secret they probably can get at the nsec, how far separated are those two things? 

 hint: you can't derive the shared secret without the secret. it's one step. one.

security of the nsec and derived secrets is almost unity

the actual data it decrypts, that's your computer it's on, it's not being SENT ANYIWHERE ffs guys, please, get some fucking realism in your threat models

if you can't trust the computer, why you use the computer?

oh yeah, because it isn't a leaky sponge like you are trying to make it out to be, yet somehow it is secure in other ways

no, fuck you. decrypted messages are adjacent to the fucking nsec