Not necessarily a critic but a question I still have regarding #drivechains: Once #Bip300 is activated, how can one create a #drivechain? Is it permisionless or is the approval of someone (miners?) required? If it is permisionless, how does Bip300 protect against a spammer who would attempt to create 256 (the maximum allowed) vanity drivechains? Are the 256 slots simply allocated on a first come, first serve basis?
This is explained in a section of BIP-300. Give it a read then let ne know what you think. https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0300.mediawiki
Maybe I’m missing something but I’m not sure how this would prevent someone from creating vanity #drivechains. Yes, there are thresholds below which a #drivechain slot can be reclaimed but wouldn’t be possible for an attacker to generate vanity transactions (=usage) to maintain the ownership of the drivechain slot? #Bip300
Miners can 'evict' vanity sidechains and make room for useful sidechains. Only sidechains which are useful to the network will survive.
What’s the mechanism for miners to evict a vanity drivechain?
They steal the hash escrow (BIP 300), or distribute the hash escrow to a better L2 of their choosing, and going forward honor the other L2's hash escrow updates.
Just like the Wisconsin Republicans are hoping to impeach a judge they don’t like before even before hearing a case. Political nuclear options often become acceptable when they shouldn’t be.
There's nothing political about this. Its objective commitment of electrons. Anyone can commit their own electrons to the process. No need for popular opinion. No need for endorsement of a political party. No need to even tell anyone you're participating. Its just math and physics. Idk what you're getting on about.
It’s 100% political among the miners. If there are situations in which it’s appropriate to steal a lockbox, the process will be controversial, hence political.
You do realize that is exactly what Bitcoin consensus is, right? If miners choose to collude to ignore a block and mine their own block to claim rewards (or TX priority or whatever) for themselves, they can. They'll need 51% hashrate, but they absolutely can. If you think that's political, then you do not understand consensus or p2p systems. Same for hash escrows. If miners want to collude to evict a sidechain, they can. It'll take 50% hash rate, but they can. Its called consensus. So, even if it was political, it would be exactly Bitcoin's current politics with no change. But... its not political. For that, I'll refer you to the definition: https://image.nostr.build/36b6df379962bba3275432996d5b4d9ff0bfb752e927ca3cae2854fe14b937ad.jpg
How is the UTXO set (or equivalent) of the side chain handled if it is overwritten?
Well in this scenario, miners have decided to steal from the 'shitcoin' sidechain to make room for a 'good' sidechain. The 'shitcoin' ledger would become valueless, and shitcoin holders would be out of pocket. That is the point though. If a vanity/shitcoin takes one of the drivechain slots, it risks getting evicted and liquidated by Bitcoin, if miners (and indirectly the users) have decided the shitcoin didn't deserve that space. So, sidechains must necessarily be 'good' for Bitcoin, or the sidechain will be sent packing. Want to start a side chain? Think long and hard about how it will synergize with Bitcoin. Put your idea into public and make sure it gets broad community support (e.g. BIP) before trying to deploy it. If you do those things, you'll have a good idea if Bitcoin will evict+liquidate your sidechain or not.
I think we can do better. Surely there is a more graceful way to wind down a drive chain. Assuming long term all drive chain slots get filled, there needs to be a way for low performing chains to drop off without rugging.
Right. I’ve suggested the Kanye West is a good candidate. Well known, maybe paranoid to have other people keep his keys, maybe doesn’t trust himself to keep his keys … why not just trust hashrate escrow? No key hygiene required.
Are you interested in trying to understand? Or are you just here to draw illogical hyperbolic comparisons for fun?
If a miner included a Kanye Weat drivechain proposal in a block, would other miners ack it? It’s a legit question. What if Kanye bribed miners for two weeks ?
I don't know. Depends if miners and users see that drivechain as valuable to the Bitcoin ecosystem (as with any other transaction or block). Majority miners can choose not to confirm and block or transaction they wish, regardless of drivechains. Majority node operators can refuse to relay any block or TX they wish, regardless of drivechains. Would the network accept a Kanye drivechain? Idk. If it was economically popular (in terms of BTC hashrate and volume) then it could exist. If it was harmful to Bitcoin, I doubt people would fight for its continued existence, but I don't have a crystal ball.
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But what even is a Kanye west drivechain in your mind? Any drivechain would still be BTC (trustless asynchronous 1:1). Are you just afraid of people calling their Bitcoin KanyeCoin or something?
Just the place where Ye holds his coin so he doesn’t have to remember his keys
Lol, that's a pretty funny thought. I doubt the Bitcoin ecosystem would support that L2, but Idfk, lolol
The drivechain folks are promising people get whatever they want. Why not? Publicity stunt might pay off
Majority miners if they existed could not make such choices without nuking the entire L1. A problem with DC is It gives miners who might be willing to collude a little playground where they have fun doing reorgs and few sniping and other shenanigans without hurting the main chain.
Wouldn't that similarly nuke the entire notion of sidechains? If miners fucked around with L1 and chose to reorg blocks to favor a cartel of miners, then it would destroy everyone's faith in Bitcoin and people wouldn't use it. If miners did the same to DCs, then it would destroy everyone's faith in DCs and people wouldn't use them. Bitcoin would remain unscathed. Ofc, in either case, that's not the economically rational decision, so game theory says economically rational miners wouldn't do that.
It could set up a path. One day, some miners are struggling so they decide to collude and mess around with a drivechain. Drivechain go south. A year or so later, the same miners are struggling, now they’ve already grooved the road to collusion. People often overestimate the speed at which miner collusion would destroy the value. It wouldn’t be overnight. Plenty of time to take their profits and go do something else.