“why intent is said to be “nine-tenths of the law.” We use motivation and
honesty in one circumstance to predict actions in others. Seeing morality as
self-serving because of indirect reciprocity enables us to visualize it in two
stages or as involving two kinds of outcomes for acts widely regarded as
immoral: 1. If I do that (“immoral thing”) to someone I am apt to suffer costs
greater than the benefits, imposed on me by the other members of my group as a
result of indirect reciprocity (within-group indirect reciprocity). 2. If I do
that (“immoral thing”) to someone I will foster, or at least not restrain, the
development of a pattern of within-group behavior that will eventually impose
a cost on me greater than the benefits. These costs will be imposed on me
either by a change of rules that I precipitate or promote against my long-term
interests or by the ability of members of groups other than my own to injure
or destroy my group because of its lack of unity (between-group indirect
reciprocity). Awareness of this last possibility by my group members will
cause them to be even more watchful of my behavior within the group, thus
increasing the costs of “immoral” actions monitored by within-group
reciprocity. The consequences of indirect reciprocity, then, include the
concomitant spread of altruism (as social investment genetically valuable to
the altruist), rules, and efforts to cheat” (Alexander, 1987, p. 114)

In general, anyone has at least the possibility of giving or receiving
benefits from anyone else (ignoring for the moment the specific costs and
benefits).

“Returns from indirect reciprocity may take at least three major forms: (1)
the beneficent individual may later be engaged in profitable reciprocal
interactions by individuals who have observed his behavior in directly
reciprocal interactions and judged him to be a potentially rewarding
interactant (his “reputation” or “status” is enhanced, to his ultimate
benefit); (2) the beneficent individual may be rewarded with direct
compensation from all or part of the group (such as with money or a medal or
social elevation as a hero) which, in turn, increases his likelihood of (and
that of his relatives) receiving additional perquisites; or (3) the beneficent
individual may be rewarded by simply having the success of the group within
which he behaved beneficently contribute to the success of his own descendants
and collateral relatives. […] reciprocity flourishes when the donated benefits
are relatively inexpensive compared to the returns […] under two
circumstances: the first is when threats or promises extrinsic to the
interactants cause joint similar efforts to be worth more than the sum of
their separate contributions, leading to more or less symmetrical cooperation.
The second is when the contributions of partners in reciprocity are different,
leading to division of labor. The second situation can arise out of different
abilities or training in different contributors, or from differences in their
accumulated resources. Systems of indirect reciprocity as expressed in humans
require memory, consistency across time, the application of precedents, and
persistent and widely communicated concepts of right and wrong” (Alexander,
1987, p. 112)

“it seems reasonable to expect the agents of a single just god of all people
to seek the truth in all of the social matters of human life as scientists are
expected to do with respect to the physical and nonhuman living universe.
Truth-seeking involves openness, and in science the basic criterion of
repeatability is maintained through openness.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 211)

“we must sharply distinguish morality and virtue as independent, though
related, species of goodness” 27

“When the interests of all are most nearly congruent, it is essentially always
due to a threat shared equally. […] Some societies have been able to structure
their defenses against external threats as separate units (armies) within
society, and to keep them separate. These rigidly hierarchical, totalitarian,
and dictatorial subunits rise and fall in size and influence according to the
importance of the external threat.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 200)

“Abandonment or cannibalism of offspring, infanticide, abortion, and
miscarriage may all be mechanisms in some mammals by which offspring
replacement or “culling” is effected at minimal expense. The evidence for
widespread superovulation in mammals (ovulation of more eggs than can survive)
appears also to be evidence of offspring replacement, although if selection of
superior offspring is involved it is not clear whether in many cases the
selection is occurring before or after fertilization.” (Alexander, 1987, p.
78)

„Diejenigen situationsgemäßen und instinktgestützten Verhaltensformen, gegen
deren Vernachlässigung die Gesellschaft drastisch einschreitet, deren
Sollgeltung also durchgesetzt wird, werden von der Sitte oder vom Recht
vorgezeichnet. Das Naturrecht stellt ähnlich den 10 Geboten allgemeinste
Normen auf, deren Erzwingbarkeit als Bedingungen des friedlichen
Zusammenlebens jeder mann einleuchtet, es erklärt die entsprechenden Impulse
für natürlich, d. h. für angeboren, und respektiert doch ihre nur prekäre
Realisierung, andernfalls die Erhebung zur bewußten Norm mit
Nachdrucksqualität unnötig wäre. Thomas Hobbes hat in De Cive (1647) eine
Reihe von „natürlichen Gesetzen" aufgezählt, die sich alle auf den Grundsatz
der Gegenseitigkeit zurückführen lassen: Daß man Verträge halte und das
gegebene Wort nicht breche; daß man den Wohltäter nicht in eine schlimme Lage
kom men lasse, oder überhaupt eine Wohltat nur annehme in der Absicht, daß
den Geber nicht mit Recht die Gabe gereue; daß jedermann sich den an dern
gefügig erweise, nicht als lästig — unter Berufung auf Ciceros humanitas, d.
h. Takt, Liebenswürdigkeit; daß man niemandem durch Worte oder Handlungen,
durch Mienen oder Lachen zeige, daß man ihn hasse oder verachte; daß jeder als
von Natur gleich dem andern erachtet werde (!); daß ein jeder die Rechte,
welche er für sich verlangt, auch jedem anderen zugestehe usw.“ 45

“The imposition of monogamy by custom or law has the interesting effect of
reducing both male-male and male-female conflicts to a minimum, especially
when clans are discouraged (as in nation states” (Alexander, 1987, p. 88)

Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices,
identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms
that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative
societies possible. 299

Das aus der Gegenseitigkeit entwickelte Ethos

“Darwin (1871) developed the first complete theory of morality and ethics,
in the following words (p. 500): Ultimately our moral sense or conscience
becomes a highly complex sentiment—originating in the social instincts,
largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by self-reason,
and confirmed by instruction and habit. It must not be forgotten that
although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to
each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe,
yet that an increase in the number of well-endowed men and advancement in
the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one
tribe over another. A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a
high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and
sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves
for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this
would be natural selection. At all times throughout the world tribes have
supplanted other tribes; and as morality is one important element in their
success, the standard of morality and the number of well-endowed men will
thus everywhere tend to rise and increase. […] It is obvious that the
members of the same tribe would approve of conduct which appeared to them to
be for the general good, and would reprobate that which appeared evil. To do
good unto others—to do unto others as ye would that they should do unto
you—is the foundation-stone of morality. It is, therefore, hardly possible
to exaggerate the importance during rude times of the love of praise and the
dread of blame. A man who was not impelled by any deep, instinctive feeling,
to sacrifice his life for the good of others, yet was roused to such actions
by a sense of glory, would by his example excite the same wish for glory in
other men, and would strengthen by exercise the noble feeling of admiration.
He might thus do far more good to his tribe than by begetting offspring with
a tendency to inherit his own high character, (p. 500)” (Alexander, 1987, p.
182)

“there is much more to heavily publicized moral and legal questions such as
abortion, euthanasia, welfare, and equal rights than meets the eye. And I
would argue that many of these “hidden” elements are only likely to be exposed
and clarified through a deep understanding of our biological-evolutionary
background—specifically, through analyzing the conflicts of interest involved
and taking into account the nature and significance of the system of indirect
reciprocity involved.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 236)

Durkheim believed that these collective emotions pull humans fully but
temporarily into the higher of our two realms, the realm of the sacred, where
the self disappears and collective interests predominate. The realm of the
profane, in contrast, is the ordinary day-to-day world where we live most of
our lives, concerned about wealth, health, and reputation, but nagged by the
sense that there is, somewhere, something higher and nobler. 251

„wird das Wort „Kosmopolit" dem Antisthenes zugeschrieben; auch sein Schüler
Diogenes soll gesagt haben „Ich bin ein Weltbürger" (Diog. Laert. VI, 63).
Demokrit, vielleicht kaum älter als Antisthenes, fand heraus, das Feld des
weisen Mannes sei die ganze Erde, das Vaterland der guten Seele der Kosmos.
Arnold A. T. Ehrhardt (Polit. Metaphysik von Solon bis Augustin, 1959, I, 162
f.) meint nun, es sei die Lehre des humanistischen Kosmopolitismus gewesen,
die den Stadtstaat auflöste, und die Anhänger der frühen kynischen wie der
kyrenäischen Schule hätten noch im frühen vierten Jahrhundert die Bindung an
die Polis als nicht menschlich empfunden. Solche Ansichten treten indessen
nicht als Ursachen auf, sondern sie sind Verarbeitungen oder Bewältigungen
einer schon eingetretenen Katastrophe, die sie bewußt und, wohlgemerkt,
definitiv machen, indem sie schon die Konsequenzen idealisieren.“ 12

“Three decades ago Konrad Lorenz also tried to name a “new field” which he
also said consisted of the evolutionary study of behavior. The label he used,
“ethology,” also came to be associated with his particular views concerning
the physiology, development, and inheritance of behavior and as a result
eventually became obscure and less frequently used.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 26)

“generosity and unselfishness are probably not taught because otherwise we
would grow up to be selfish, but because otherwise we would grow up to be
bumblers rather than experts at self-interested activities. Up to now, I would
argue, social learning has been all about becoming better at self-
interest—indeed, about becoming so good at it that we will be regarded as
honest, kind, fair, impartial, reliable, and altruistic not only by our social
interactants but also by our own conscious selves.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 155)

[…] genetic evolution greatly accelerated during the last 50,000 years. The
rate at which genes changed in response to selection pressures began rising
around 40,000 years ago, and the curve got steeper and steeper after 20,000
years ago. Genetic change reached a crescendo during the Holocene era, in
Africa as well as in Eurasia. It makes perfect sense. In the last ten years,
geneticists have discovered just how active genes are. Genes are constantly
turning on and off in response to conditions such as stress, starvation, or
sickness. 239

“ Unrestrained embellishment characterizes signals passed between sharply
competitive individuals, such as brief interactants and nonrelatives, in which
the degree of embellishment is determined, not by shared interests between
signaler and signalée, but by how much the signaler can get away with—what
Otte (1974) called “the limits of gullibility” in the responder. […]
Unrestrained embellishment differs from total deception mainly because
gullibility may be reduced among conspecific competitors.” (Alexander, 1987,
p. 93)

“we regard as the really best man the man in whom virtue and morality are
united.” 28

“Both law and ethics are much more concerned with punishment than with
rewards, because, I believe, they are systems of restraints against too-
extreme acts of self-interest. Both law and ethics are most often a defense of
the many against the few: the many who recognize the value (to themselves and
theirs) of the unity, strength, and persistence of the group against the few
with shorter (or longer) vision or alternative connections. The moralizer is
one who is making a special effort to turn it all to his own personal gain
within the group. He is damned only with faint resistance, for what he
advocates is that ideal behavior which if universal would further the
interests of the group. He has the possibility of gaining (1) because his
advocacy not only is aimed to correspond to the group’s interests but
simultaneously portrays him as more a promoter of the ideal than his actions
may reveal (i.e., his moralizing, if cleverly done, may draw attention away
from his own transgressions), and (2) because he may induce self-deleterious
behavior in others. […] the general trend of law is toward equalizing access
to the usual resources of reproduction, including mates.” (Alexander, 1987, p.
195)

“Whether or not those who originated and promoted the notion of a single god
for all people, and an impartial god, really practiced what they preached, the
fact remains that the mere concept represented an opposite or a denial of the
competitive principles that had governed human existence as a consequence of
its evolutionary background. In this sense a universal impartial god
represented what Thomas Huxley called “combating” natural selection. The
notion of a god of all people, who was impartial, was the notion of a god who
could not condone inequalities such as polygyny, slavery, and caste systems.
It was the notion of a god who was, in the modern philosophers’ terms, morally
consistent, and who insisted on, or promoted, moral consistency among humans
[…] It is the negation of personal selfishness, selfishness for one’s family,
or favoritism even to one’s own group members (tribe, nation) as opposed to
others. Institution of such a god represented a formalizing of the moral ideal
toward which many humans would like to think they have always been striving.
This kind of god would have been from the start the hope of ordinary
people—the peasants and the downtrodden and the minorities.” (Alexander, 1987,
p. 212)

“The distinction I would suggest between moral and legal systems is that legal
systems arise out of long-continued agreement, by either the majority or the
power structure, on matters of right and wrong: such agreement leads to
establishment of more or less permanent régulations, and this works because
such a high proportion of the powerful people in the society agree. Moral
systems, on the other hand, comprise belief systems of subgroups and
proportions of the people that are small enough, or else belief systems that
change often enough, to reduce the desires and tendencies of society as a
whole to make them into definite, permanent, or irreversible regulations.
Everyone knows that issues of morality and ethics present paradoxes; and many
know that not merely ordinary people in their everyday activities but the
intellectuals and formal students of moral systems across the ages have made
little progress toward resolving the moral paradoxes since the first records
of their consideration by the ancients. […] If we were all agreed on what is
conducive to harmonious happiness, morality as a topic of interest—perhaps as
a topic at all—would fade.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 194)

„So wurde wieder einmal wahr, was David Hume im Jahre 1739 schrieb: „Das
Äußerste, was Politiker zustande bringen können, besteht in einer Erweiterung
der natürlichen Gefühle über ihre natürlichen Grenzen hinaus" (Abhdlg. über
die menschl. Natur III/II/2).“ 160

“rape will occur most frequently in regions populated by women of relatively
high status and men of relatively low status. […] rape is more common in
university towns with a considerable population of transient males.”
(Alexander, 1987, p. 230)

“theories of inclusive-fitness-maximizing (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocity
(Trivers, 1971) enable us to formulate testable hypotheses about aspects of
altruism that previously could not be investigated scientifically. […] I
regard indirect reciprocity as a consequence of direct reciprocity occurring
in the presence of interested audiences—groups of individuals who continually
evaluate the members of their society as possible future interactants from
whom they would like to gain more than they lose” (Alexander, 1987, p. 111)

These beliefs and practices turned out to matter very little. Whether you
believe in hell, whether you pray daily, whether you are a Catholic,
Protestant, Jew, or Mormon … none of these things correlated with generosity.
The only thing that was reliably and powerfully associated with the moral
benefits of religion was how enmeshed people were in relationships with their
co-religionists. It’s the friendships and group activities, carried out within
a moral matrix that emphasizes selflessness. That’s what brings out the best
in people. Putnam and Campbell reject the New Atheist emphasis on belief and
reach a conclusion straight out of Durkheim: “It is religious belongingness
that matters for neighborliness, not religious believing.” 296

What, then, is the function of moral reasoning? Does it seem to have been
shaped, tuned, and crafted (by natural selection) to help us find the truth,
so that we can know the right way to behave and condemn those who behave
wrongly? If you believe that, then you are a rationalist, like Plato,
Socrates, and Kohlberg. Or does moral reasoning seem to have been shaped,
tuned, and crafted to help us pursue socially strategic goals, such as
guarding our reputations and convincing other people to support us, or our
team, in disputes? If you believe that, then you are a Glauconian. 91

it’s no puzzle to understand why people want to lead. The real puzzle is why
people are willing to follow. […] people evolved to live in groups of up to
150 that were relatively egalitarian and wary of alpha males […]. But we also
evolved the ability to rally around leaders when our group is under threat or
is competing with other groups. 264

“1. Direct somatic effort is mediated by neither nepotism nor reciprocity.
Examples are eating, drinking, seeking shelter, and avoiding danger, when
these actions are carried out without the assistance or positive intervention
of others. This category of behavior, which probably corresponds most closely
to the moral philosophers’ egoism (particularly when the latter specifically
involves seeking to promote one’s own welfare rather than someone else’s), is
not as common as might be thought in today’s specialized social environment.
We can actually do very little for ourselves without some kind of assistance,
however indirect, by others. […]

“our efforts toward idealized models of morality within societies may also
cause, ironically, the most serious threats to humanity. Nationalistic
chauvinism, patriotism, and pride in one’s own group, society, people,
religion, or way of life represent the large-scale cooperative efforts that
produce adversaries capable of destroying the world and incapable so far of
withdrawing from the brink of disaster. Perhaps we must substitute a different
model of morality which admits and accepts the history of individual efforts
that philosophers would call egoistic” (Alexander, 1987, p. 204)

“In humans the laws and mores of larger and larger groups seem increasingly to
(1) guarantee to every individual the right to produce and rear its own
offspring and (2) restrict the amount and likelihood of variation in
reproduction among families. China is currently an extreme in both size (over
one billion) and regulation of reproduction […] the government of India now
pays individuals who submit to sterilization. More subtle, but also more
widespread, are laws that reduce variance in access to resources, such as
graduated income taxes, the vote, representative government, elected (not
hereditarily succeeding) officials, and universal education.” (Alexander,
1987, p. 89)

If you see one hundred insects working together toward a common goal, it’s a
sure bet they’re siblings. But when you see one hundred people working on a
construction site or marching off to war, you’d be astonished if they all
turned out to be members of one large family. Human beings are the world
champions of cooperation beyond kinship, and we do it in large part by
creating systems of formal and informal accountability. 91

“If egoism, as self-interest in the biologists’ sense, is the reason for the
promotion of ethical behavior, then, paradoxically, it is expected that
everyone will constantly promote the notion that egoism is not a suitable
theory of action, and, a fortiori, that he himself is not an egoist.”
(Alexander, 1987, p. 167)

„Man darf nicht vergessen, daß seit langem, seit der Dänenfrage 1848 oder
spätestens seit dem Krimkrieg sich die große europäische Auseinandersetzung
vorbereitete, die durch die freie Expansion in Übersee immerhin um einige
Jahrzehnte vertagt wurde; so entstand die Periode einer unwahrscheinlich
langen Waffenruhe von 1871 bis 1914.“ 105

“overlaps of human interests are appropriately classified as follows:

“The longer the usual lives of individuals, and the longer individuals
continue to interact significantly and repeatedly with one another, the
greater will be their adeptness at assessing and acting appropriately with
respect to partial confluences of interest, as well as conflicts of interest,
and the more complex will be society.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 82)

„Auch das Gesinnungsethos entstand in der Antike; als Plinius Statthalter in
Bithynien war, etwa im Jahre 112, wurde das Bekenntnis zu Christus mit dem
Tode bestraft auch ohne Nachweis des Kultes, und umgekehrt behauptete der
gleichzeitig lebende Justin, ein Diener Christi sei schon seiner ganzen Natur
nach frei von aller Schuld — die Gesinnung kompromittierte oder qualifizierte
also unabhängig vom Verhalten, mithin absolut.“ 146

“To the extent that males and females (of any species) commit themselves to
lifetime monogamy, the interests of two individuals in a pair approach being
identical. […] to the extent that (1) philandering is unlikely or too
expensive to be profitable, and (2) the relatives of one or the other are not
significantly more available for nepotistic diversions of resources, each
member of the pair will profit from complete cooperation with the other to
produce and rear their joint offspring. In humans this condition is most
likely in (1) societies in which (a) families live and work separately and (b)
husband and wife are in fairly close contact most of the time and (2)
societies in which married couples are “neolocal,” living in some new location
apart from both sets of relatives but close enough to be affected by the
interests of their kin networks in sustaining the marriage. In such societies
(which historically have probably been most often agricultural), I predict
that the devotion of husband and wife will be measurably most complete.”
(Alexander, 1987, p. 88)


„Der nach Alexandrien geflüchtete Kleomenes von Sparta erhielt eine Pension
von 144 000 Drachmen — zweihundertfünfzig Jahre vorher hatte man den Pausanias
noch im Tempel eingemauert und verhungern lassen. Alle denkbaren
Wissenschaften wurden betrieben, die Emanzipation begann: Damen ließen ihre
Wagen in Olympia laufen, in Ägypten wie in Sparta waren sie
Grundbesitzerinnen, sie schrieben Bücher und gründeten Clubs. So hält sich im
Umkreis erst der hellenistischen Kultur, dann des römischen Reiches das Ideal
der Menschenfreundlichkeit als öffentliche Meinung, zur Zeit Domitians ist
Dio Chrysostomos „ganz durchdrungen von dem Humanitätsgedanken, wie die
Kyniker und Stoiker hält er die Unterschiede der Menschen mit Ausnahme der
sittlichen für nichtig: das ganze Menschengeschlecht ist achtenswert und
gleich vornehm" (v. Arnim). Unter dem Einfluß der stoischen Ethik drangen
philanthropische Tendenzen vor, das Leben des Sklaven, die Ehre der Sklavin
wurden durch immer neue Gesetze geschützt; der Staat begann sich sozial zu
betätigen, indem er arme Kinder verpflegte, bei Bankrotten und Konfiskationen
schonte man das Existenzminimum der Angehörigen, ein ungemeiner Fortschritt im
Vergleich zu der eisernen Härte des alten Schuldrechts.“ 78

we see faces in the clouds, but never clouds in faces, because we have special
cognitive modules for face detection. The face detector is on a hair trigger,
and it makes almost all of its mistakes in one direction—false positives
(seeing a face when no real face is present […]), rather than false negatives
(failing to see a face that is really present). 279

“Singer’s reference to “the point of view of the whole,” and his arguments for
“broadening” “the circle of altruism” to “members of other societies,” “all
human beings,” and even beyond is not really a “momentous new stage in our
moral thinking.” As I have noted, Darwin (1871), T. H. Huxley (1896), and
Keith (1949) all discussed the same possibility, and Darwin’s discussion was
actually similar to Singer’s. There is also a parallel in the rise of the idea
of God as representing the views of all the people (Vox populi, vox Dei);
eventually all people everywhere, and not just the members of one’s own
society; and even the rest of the universe, in which God may be regarded as
having interest because he created it (his eye, after all, is “on the
sparrow”). […] We are apt to judge others not only as a result of their
treatment of other humans, but as a result of their treatment of even nonhuman
organisms, and this, I believe, is why the limits of “rights” are indefinite,
as the arguments of this philosopher, and Singer, would imply.” (Alexander,
1987, p. 171)


“To understand our social and moral systems we have to unravel their fabric
until we begin to see precisely how it has been created from the interlacing
of the threads of individual reproductive striving. […] conflicts of interests
arise out of a history of genetic individuality. […] altruism appears
generally to diminish with decreasing degrees of relatedness in sexual species
whenever it is studied—in humans as well as nonhuman species” (Alexander,
1987, p. 82)

“biologists proceed as if the lives of all organisms can be understood better
by seeing them first as predictable patterns of somatic and reproductive
effort […] Proximate-cause reductionism (or reduction by dissection) sometimes
advances our understanding of the whole phenomena. This happens when the
mechanism discovered or elucidated is unique or new, has a special kind of
practical application, or itself represents a simplification through
generalization. Discovering that diseases are caused by microorganisms, that
cancer results from mutated genes, or that the genetic materials of all life
are likely to be deoxyribonucleic acid are obvious examples. When evolutionary
reduction becomes trivial in the study of life it is for a reason different
from incompleteness; rather, it is because the breadth of the generalization
distances it too significantly from a particular problem that may be at hand.
For example, if a group of political scientists or physicists meeting to avert
an imminent nuclear disaster were presented with a discussion of the general
principles of conflict strategies and confrontations throughout the history of
life (nonhuman as well as human), they might think that someone had changed
the subject. Even if they realized that this was background material they
should have had available to them to make the best decisions, there might be
no time to review or absorb it. […] “the greatest weakness of reduction by
generalization is not that it is likely to be trivial but that errors are
probable through unjustified leap from hypothesis to conclusion, by either
those who generate hypotheses or those who hear about them.” (Alexander, 1987,
p. 37)

After analyzing the DNA of 13,000 Australians, scientists recently found
several genes that differed between liberals and conservatives. Most of them
related to neurotransmitter functioning, particularly glutamate and serotonin,
both of which are involved in the brain’s response to threat and fear. This
finding fits well with many studies showing that conservatives react more
strongly than liberals to signs of danger, including the threat of germs and
contamination, and even low-level threats such as sudden blasts of white
noise. Other studies have implicated genes related to receptors for the
neurotransmitter dopamine, which has long been tied to sensation-seeking and
openness to experience, which are among the best-established correlates of
liberalism. As the Renaissance writer Michel de Montaigne said: “The only
things I find rewarding … are variety and the enjoyment of diversity.” 309

Bees construct hives out of wax and wood fibers, which they then fight, kill,
and die to defend. Humans construct moral communities out of shared norms,
institutions, and gods that, even in the twenty-first century, they fight,
kill, and die to defend. 230

„nach der Kapitulation Athens die künstlerische, literarische und
philosophische Kultur sich schnell in den Zustand der Fassade verwandelte.
Gerade in entleerter Form eroberte der attische Geist das gesamte Griechenland
und dann den mittelmeerischen Raum, in den Außenstellen von Britannien und
Spanien bis Indien reichend. Die Großartigkeit und Vollkommenheit dieser
Schöpfungen er wies sich als formal ablösbar, sie konnten über die Welt hin
nachgeahmt und kolportiert werden, zu eben der Zeit, als dem Volke, aus dessen
Kraft sie einst entstanden, alle Knochen gebrochen waren. Die Impulse der
Kultur gingen nunmehr in die Richtung der eigenen Reproduktion, sie wurde
rhetorisch, dekorativ und nach oben abgeschoben, und sie gewann sich in eben
dieser Form die Liebe und die grenzenlose Bewunderung vieler Generationen,
ohne deren eigene Lebensfragen überhaupt noch anzusprechen, es sei denn in
Kleinformen, Alltagsszenen und Lustspielen. Unter den Philosophen blieben die
Kyniker und Stoiker echt politisch. Daß Kultur gerade als Fassade
transportabel wird, kennen wir, ein solcher Zustand ist seit langem erreicht;
die künstlerischen Äußerungstypen und Produkte der Resteverwertung werden seit
Jahrzehnten über die halbe Welt hin- und hergezogen, wobei der zunehmenden
Degeneration der steigende Aufwand an Reklame, aber auch an öffentlichen
Mitteln, entspricht. Das, was Wyndham Lewis die "große propagandistische
Nebenhandlung, genannt KULTUR" nannte, etablierte sich: schon einmal zur Zeit
des Hellenismus. Dies ist ein phänomenales Schauspiel, das in seiner Eigenart
nur Ernst Howald (Die Kultur der Antike, 1936, 1948) erkannte: „Der Siegeszug
der athenischen Kultur durch Griechenland nahm von dem Zeitpunkt an, wo sie in
Athen ihren Existenzboden verloren hatte, geradezu stürmische Formen an"
(1948, 82).“ 24f

„In unseren sonderbaren Zeiten bedarf sogar die Ordnung noch der
Verteidigung. Sie ist der Zustand, der das Auseinandertreten der Positionen
zur Unversöhnlichkeit erspart, der den Gewissenskonflikt der Politik bis zur
Erträglichkeit temperiert, der eine gute Sorte von Freiheit zutage bringt,
nämlich das Recht, alles zu tun, was die Gesetze erlauben [...]. Damit soll
nicht geleugnet werden, daß es Fortschritt gibt: Überall da, wo die Technik,
die exakten Wissenschaften zum Zuge kamen, ist er evident, das Elend von
früher ist gemindert und der soziale Anstand immerhin so weit durchgesetzt,
daß jeder seine Rolle mit Würde spielen kann — erst die Studenten haben das
wieder zerstört und dieses Recht ihren Lehrern genommen.“ 172

“The peril of human extinction arises out of the tendency of humans across
history to seek and accept knowledge more readily in physical than in social
realms. The point is that we have learned how to manipulate the physical
universe so as to extinguish ourselves, and we have simultaneously been
reluctant about learning how to manipulate the social universe so as to
prevent self-extinction.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 247)

“With respect to the success of the offspring itself, most other people in
society (leaving aside the close relatives of the parents, particularly the
parents’ parents) are affected less by the offspring’s success or failure than
are its close relatives. Yet the rest of society acts as though what happens
to someone else’s offspring is of great concern. […] the rise of indirect
reciprocity in large technological civilizations is what causes the citizenry
of such societies—as opposed to those in small, nontechnological societies—to
view abortion and infanticide more frequently as a concern of more than the
parents alone.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 220)

„Im Zeitalter des Im-Stich-lassens gibt es kaum eine Schuld, die nicht schon
durch Treue versöhnt würde. Im übrigen vermöchte ein asketisches Klima gerade
auf den Höhen des Staates den hinfälligen Regierungen ein Ansehen zu
vermitteln, das die Image-Fabriken vergeblich herzustellen suchen würden, an
dieser Stelle übrigens auch gar nicht wollen. Mit dem Zitat von Goethe: „Es
gibt im Menschen ein Dienenwollendes" muß man bereits befürchten, sich
lächerlich zu machen, wenn man in einer Welt lebt, in der die „Kritik" die
Treuepflicht zu über subjektiven Werten grundsätzlich anräsonniert. Wenn man
sagt, der Dienst an den Institutionen sei die „Entfremdung", so ist das ganz
richtig, aber diese Entfremdung ist die Freiheit, nämlich die Distanz zu sich
selbst und zu dem, was sich so zufällig im Kopf und Herzen abgelagert hat,
wenn diese lange genug den Meinungsmachern ausgeliefert waren. Man mag
verpflichtet sein, Meinungen Anderer zu achten, aber selbst welche zu haben
ist ein Laster, denn sie sind es, mit denen angebbare Kreise die Auflösung
der Institutionen legitimieren, um die Gesellschaft in eine Masse von
Particüliers zu verwandeln.“ 72

“In Kohlberg’s Level A the child depends on immediate rewards and punishments:
nothing is given up for later or long-term rewards. In Level B immediate
rewards are foregone in the interests of longer-term rewards, and the
decisions or actions are based on an expectation of reciprocity (reward) from
the individuals in the child’s immediate group or actual presence. In Level C
the individual has so effectively absorbed knowledge of the systems of rewards
and punishments within society at large that (I suggest) it profits from using
its own judgment, or following its conscience, and sometimes reaps rewards not
solely from persons and groups involved at the time or in its immediate
group.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 146)

“Moral and legal systems are commonly distinguished by those, like moral
philosophers, who study them formally. I believe, however, that the
distinction between them is usually poorly drawn, and based on a failure to
realize that moral as well as legal behavior occurs as a result of probable
and possible punishments and reward.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 191)

- a. The realm in which the word ethics is most employed
- b. Best characterized (or most likely to be) conscious

Individually distinctive; personally unique

„Gerade weil die entscheidenden ethischen Probleme unlösbar sind, weil sie
aus dem Widerstreit der letzten Instanzen im Herzen entstehen, den heute
niemand auszutragen gewillt scheint, werden sie in den Gesinnungsraum
vorverlegt, dort absolut gesetzt und damit zugleich entleert. Parallel mit der
Hypertrophie des humanitär-eudaimonistischen Ethos verfallen die Sitten und
nimmt die innersoziale Gereiztheit zu. Man muß dazu bedenken, daß Kritik und
Angriff die einzigen Mittel zur Wirksamkeit darstellen, die der Intellektuelle
überhaupt besitzt, denn eine lobende, unterstreichende oder bestätigende
Geste zu etwas, das im Raume der praktischen Welt ohne ihn entstanden ist und
sich hält, wäre ja offenbar überflüssig. Einen „Auftrag zur Kritik" hat
niemand den Massenmedien erteilt, sondern dies ist die einzige ihnen
erreichbare und mit Wirkungspotential ausgestattete Aktionsform [...]“ 151

beginning in the 1980s, scientists increasingly recognized that emotions were
filled with cognition. Emotions occur in steps, the first of which is to
appraise something that just happened based on whether it advanced or hindered
your goals. These appraisals are a kind of information processing; they are
cognitions. When an appraisal program detects particular input patterns, it
launches a set of changes in your brain that prepare you to respond
appropriately. For example, if you hear someone running up behind you on a
dark street, your fear system detects a threat and triggers your sympathetic
nervous system, firing up the fight-or-flight response, cranking up your heart
rate, and widening your pupils to help you take in more information. Emotions
are not dumb. Damasio’s patients made terrible decisions because they were
deprived of emotional input into their decision making. Emotions are a kind of
information processing. Contrasting emotion with cognition is therefore as
pointless as contrasting rain with weather, or cars with vehicles. […] two
different kinds of cognition: intuition and reasoning. Moral emotions are one
type of moral intuition, but most moral intuitions are more subtle; they don’t
rise to the level of emotions. 59

„Die definitive Unterscheidung von „geistlich" und „weltlich" wurde, wie
Böckenförde ausführt (Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der
Säkularisation, in: Säkularisation und Utopie, 1967, 75 ff.), anläßlich des
Investiturstreites geboren. Damals hat sich die Ecclesia als eigene, sich
juristisch verfassende, sakramental-hierarchische Institution aus der
umfassenden Einheit des orbis christianus losgelöst, der Kaiser wurde in die
Weltlichkeit entlassen (79), und gerade dies war das Mittel, um nunmehr die
Vorherrschaft des Papstes zu behaupten: Die Voraussetzung für das
Geltendmachen dieser Vorherrschaft war die Anerkennung der Weltlichkeit, die
prinzipielle Säkularisation der Politik.“ 102

“If we fail to scrutinise the meaning of the terms "end" and "purpose," we are
apt to assume uncritically that all deliberate action, i.e., action proper,
must have a purpose; we then become puzzled both when we look for the purpose
of an action done from a sense of obligation, and also when we try to apply to
such an action the distinction of means and end, the truth all the time being
that since there is no end, there is no means either.” 27

“There are obvious possible reasons why failures to censure homosexuality and
suicide might adversely affect one’s reproductive success; and it is easy to
argue that some actions—even possibly both of these actions—are “unnatural” in
the sense that they might derive from developmental experiences that are
historically or evolutionarily novel.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 164)

„Zugleich errichtet man in Gedanken eine Natur höherer Ordnung, die zugleich
moralimprägniert sein soll; so werden die weiß Gott doch auch natürlichen
Unterschiede zwischen den Menschen und ihren verschiedenen Kulturprägungen
subalternisiert: Wer in diesem Sinne argumentiert, ist intellektuell und
moralisch rückständig und kommt unter Logosträgem nicht in Betracht. Die
schlichte Bezeichnung dessen, was ist, rückt in die Nähe des „Vorurteils",
denn die wahre Vernunft hält sich in Allgemeinheiten auf.“ 29

„Schumpeter sah ganz richtig, die kapitalistische Bourgeoisie sei geneigt,
auf der Anwendung der sittlichen Gebote des Privatlebens in den
internationalen Beziehungen zu bestehen (209), so wie der Kellogg-Pakt (1928)
den Krieg wie eine Wegelagerei zum Verbrechen erklärte. Auch dieses
bürgerliche Ethos hat sich als sozialisierbar erwiesen, es ist von den
Intellektuellen seit langem über die Welt hin verbreitet worden. Die
Menschheit entsteht durch Propaganda, sagte G. Benn (Der Ptolemäer,
Lotosland). Und zwar entstand sie im 18. Jahrhundert. Bei Holbach, der im
Jahre 1789 starb, bevor er seine Saat reifen sah, hieß es: „Die Menschlichkeit
ist ein Knoten, um den Bürger von Paris mit dem von Peking zu verbinden"; so
sollte eine scheinbar unpolitische Binnenmoral der „Menschheit" von einer
überdehnten Hausmoral geliefert werden, im Wunschbild waren die Bürger von
Paris und Peking Flurnachbarn. Da wird doch der verdeckt politische Inhalt
erkennbar, denn mit dieser Priorität würde man den Staatstugenden die Wurzeln
abgraben, dem Behauptungswillen, der Treue zur eigenen Gründung, der
wachsamen Sorgfalt und dem Willen, Grenze und Identität zu behaupten — mit
einem Wort: dem Patriotismus. Auch wird klar, wer das Wort führt: der
Intellektuelle der Großstadt, der Konformist der Negation, dessen ganze
Geltungschance von einer Kritik abhängt, die schmerzend trifft. Ungeachtet des
hohen Wertes des familiären Ethos und der Stabilität der Institution Familie
muß doch gesagt werden, daß sie niemals der Ort eines bedeutenden Fortschritts
gewesen ist. Jede große, neue Weltbewegung hat sich gegen den Familiengeist
durchsetzen müssen, so der ägyptische Regiestaat, die griechische Polis, das
ursprüngliche Christentum, so wie Jakobus und Johannes ihren Vater im Schiff
ließen, und auch der Kommunismus mit seiner wissenschaftlichen Diktatur. Die
Familie brachte eine edle, ausweitungsfähige Binnenmoral hervor, sie ist
unentbehrlich für eine lebenslange seelische Gesundheit; aber alles, was
Größe hat: Staat, Religion, Künste, Wissenschaften wurde außerhalb ihres
Bereiches hochgezogen, und selbst die Wirtschaft nahm erst große Dimensionen
an, als sie sich aus ihrem Verbände gelöst hatte.“ 89f

“human arms races and intergroup resource competition are even more bizarre
and less controlled than runaway sexual selection. These two cultural races
are obviously dangerous because together they may lead to irrevocable
disasters, up to and including extinction of the human species or all of life
on Earth. Part of their danger comes from a kind of synergism or feedback
between them. […] Neither the arms race nor the resource-competition race has
any of the usual brakes that eventually slow down and prevent further
evolutionary races, whether cultural or noncultural. […] Because we have so
reduced the impact of all other hostile forces on our lives, the weapons and
resource races both continue virtually unchecked […] Even if arms races are as
old as life itself, however, there may be no precedent for the kind of largely
unchecked arms race in which the great powers of the world are currently
involved.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 240)

“Why is the Ethics so disappointing? Not, I think, because it really answers
two radically different questions as if they were one: 1. "What is the happy
life?" 2. "What is the virtuous life?" It is, rather, because Aristotle does
not do what we as Moral Philosophers want him to do, viz., to convince us that
we really ought to do what in our non-reflective consciousness we have
hitherto believed we ought to do, or, if not, to tell us what, if any, are the
other things which we really ought to do, and to prove to us that he is right.
Now, if what I have just been contending is true, a systematic account of the
virtuous character cannot possibly satisfy this demand. At best it can only
make clear to us the details of one of our obligations, viz., the obligation
to make ourselves better men; but the achievement of this does not help us to
discover what we ought to do in life as a whole and why; to think that it did
would be to think that our only business in life was self-improvement. Hence
it is not surprising that Aristotle's account of the good man strikes us as
almost wholly of academic value, with little relation to our real demand,
which is formulated in Plato's words:on gar peri ton epitucontoV o logoV alla
peri ton ontina tropon crh xhn.” 29

„Zenon vertrat sogar schon die beachtliche Ansicht, daß alle
Verwandtschaftsverbindungen und Stammespflichten vor der „Tugend"
zurückzutreten hätten: „Dementsprechend stellte er in seinem Staate nur die
wirklich Tugendhaften als solche hin, die man als Mitbürger, Freunde,
Verwandte und Freie (!) bezeichnen dürfe" (Diog. Laert. VII, 33) — die
daseinswichtigen Qualifikationen sollte man demnach von der Einstufung durch
Intellektuelle zu erwarten haben, nämlich den Mitgliedern der stoischen Loge.
Dies kann als eine zukunftshaltige Erfindung angesprochen werden, man verlieh
so etwas wie ein gesinnungsethisches Bürgerrecht in einem noch utopischen
Überstaat. Sehr viel später kam die Aufklärung auf solche Gedanken mit großer
Wirksamkeit zurück. Wenn Zenon, ein Phönizier, die Instinkte der längst
entpolitisierten asiatischen kultivierten Schichten im Westen in Politik
umsetzen wollte, dann konnte die Eroberung der Eroberer nur mit Hilfe der
griechischen Kultur vor sich gehen, denn diese war die Eintrittskarte an jeden
Hof und in jedes gebildete Bewußtsein. Der Background dieser neuen Richtungen
ist übrigens auch nicht uninteressant. Unter den Kynikern war Antisthenes von
nicht vollgültiger Ehe, Diogenes unter dubiosen Umständen verbannt, Monimos
ein fortgejagter Sklave; nur Krates scheint Vollbürger gewesen zu sein, er
entäußerte sich freiwillig seines Vermögens. Mit der Stoa verlegten sich die
Einflüsse ganz nach dem Osten; bis in die römische Zeit waren fast alle
Stoiker Asiaten aus Zypern, Kilikien, Syrien, Mesopotamien; nur Panaitios war
Grieche aus Rhodos.“ 27f

the Ilongot, a tribe in the Philippines whose young men gained honor by
cutting off people’s heads. Some of these beheadings were revenge killings,
which offered Western readers a motive they could understand. But many of
these murders were committed against strangers who were not involved in any
kind of feud with the killer. The author explained these most puzzling
killings as ways that small groups of men channeled resentments and frictions
within the group into a group-strengthening “hunting party,” capped off by a
long night of communal celebratory singing. This was my first hint that
morality often involves tension within the group linked to competition between
different groups. 22

„Zenon, geboren um 340, war kein Grieche, sondern ein Phönizier aus Zypern,
Sohn eines Mnaseas, nach Pohlenz ein hellenisierter Name aus Manasse oder
Menahem. Er galt als einer der reichsten Männer seiner Zeit mit einem Kapital
von 1000 Talenten, das er nach Diog. Laert. VII, 13 in Reedergeschäften
auslieh, war Philanthrop und Wahlathener.“ 20

We care about violence toward many more classes of victims today than our
grandparents did in their time. Political parties and interest groups strive
to make their concerns become current triggers of your moral modules. To get
your vote, your money, or your time, they must activate at least one of your
moral foundations. 153

„Verpflichtungen gegen nicht Anwesende oder gar abstrakte Antipoden sind uns
schwer ans Herz zu bringen, und umgekehrt schafft das Fernsehen, das uns die
Leiden der unglücklichen Bevölkerung von Sonstwoland unmittelbar ins Haus
setzt, eine noch schwer übersehbare, sicher folgenreiche Veränderung unserer
Verpflichtungsgefühle, vielleicht in Hinsicht der Abstumpfung nun auch gegen
leibhaft gegenwärtiges Leiden. Eine Fern-Ethik gehört also noch in den Bereich
der Versuche und Irrtümer. K. Lorenz hat die ethische Verunsicherung als Folge
der Durchbrechung der Nahsicht-Bedingung an der Vervollkommnung der
technischen Tötungsmittel gezeigt: Derselbe Mann, der die schwersten
Hemmungen hätte, einem Wehrlosen vor ihm den Schädel einzuschlagen, macht
sich kaum Gedanken, wieviele Menschen die Bombe tötet, die er mit einem
Fingerdruck abschickt.“ 53

“if, as is usually the case, we mean by the "Theory of Knowledge" the
knowledge which supplies the answer to the question "Is what we have hitherto
thought knowledge really knowledge?" there is and can be no such thing, and
the supposition that there can is simply due to a confusion.” 30

„mit der motorischen Entlastung und physischen Bequemlichkeit des modernen
Kulturmenschen scheint seine Verhetzbarkeit und Erregungsneigung zuzunehmen“
41

Studies of charitable giving in the United States show that people in the
least religious fifth of the population give just 1.5 percent of their money
to charity. People in the most religious fifth (based on church attendance,
not belief) give a whopping 7 percent of their income to charity, and the
majority of that giving is to religious organizations. It’s the same story for
volunteer work: religious people do far more than secular folk, and the bulk
of that work is done for, or at least through, their religious organizations.
There is also some evidence that religious people behave better in lab
experiments—especially when they get to work with each other. 294

“The preconscious-postconscious approach to rights seems to me to be
consistent with the aspects of these problems that involve the stake of
society as a whole in a viable system of indirect reciprocity. In a society
cemented largely by reciprocity it appears to be important that a generally
lofty selfview be held by the citizenry with regard to the propensity for
beneficence within the society. It does not appear to be beneficent to kill a
helpless, developing embryo or a moribund person. If the interests of such
embryos and moribund people conflict with those of healthy, conscious, aware
people, however, then the question of how to resolve the conflict will not
disappear.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 223)

“morality is a matter of whose interests one should, by conscious and willful
behavior, serve, and how much; evolutionary knowledge contains no messages on
this issue. The most it can do is provide information about the reasons for
current conditions and predict some consequences of alternative courses of
action.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 232)

- a. No ethical or moral problems are involved
- b. Best characterized as (or most likely to be) nonconscious

Shared within subgroups; different between subgroups; overlapping but
different among individuals

“we are evidently evolved not only to aid the genetic materials in our own
bodies, by creating and assisting descendants, but also to assist, by
nepotism, copies of our genes that reside in collateral (nondescendant)
relatives. […] nearly all humans believe it is a normal part of the
functioning of every human individual now and then to assist someone else in
the realization of that person’s own interests to the actual net expense of
those of the altruist. […] despite our intuitions, there is not a shred of
evidence to support this view of beneficence” (Alexander, 1987, p. 23)

they are actual superorganisms. So, if the past is any guide, corporations
will grow ever more powerful as they evolve, and as they change the legal and
political systems of their host countries to become ever more hospitable. The
only force left on Earth that can stand up to the largest corporations are
national governments, 330

“The attempt to base the sense of obligation on the recognition of the
goodness of something is really an attempt to find a purpose in a moral action
in the shape of something good which, as good, we want. And the expectation
that the goodness of something underlies an obligation disappears as soon as
we cease to look for a purpose.” 27

So Hume’s model fit these cases best: when the master (passions) drops dead,
the servant (reasoning) has neither the ability nor the desire to keep the
estate running. Everything goes to ruin. 48


„Sie ist das Werk der Intellektuellen, die so gern die Freiheit und den
Globuseinfluß für sich und die sozialisti sche Gleichheit bei den Anderen
hätten. [...] hier wird Herrschaft erstrebt, und für die Massen die
Lämmerweide.“ 114

„Wenn die Daseinsnot am schlechten Willen der Regierenden liegt, kann man wie
ein Provinzanwalt das große, keineswegs menschenfreundliche Schicksal auf
Personen ablenken und diese haftbar machen. Der Haß gegen den Luxus der
Feudalen, vielleicht antike Reminiszenzen an frugales Hirtenleben und vor
allem wohl die Ahnung, daß ein Automatismus zunehmender Glücksgefräßigkeit
bevorstehen könne, haben nun gerade bei den logisch konsequentesten, d. h.
blutigsten Fortschrittlern den Gedanken an Glücksmaximierung ausgeschlossen:
Robespierre, Saint-Just und Babeuf verkündeten einhellig „le bonheur de
médiocrité" - das Kleingärtnerglück.“ 61

Michael Tomasello, one of the world’s foremost experts on chimpanzee cognition
[…]: “It is inconceivable that you would ever see two chimpanzees carrying a
log together.” I was stunned. Chimps are arguably the second-smartest species
on the planet, able to make tools, learn sign language, predict the intentions
of other chimps, and deceive each other to get what they want. As individuals,
they’re brilliant. So why can’t they work together? What are they missing?
Tomasello’s great innovation was to create a set of simple tasks that could be
given to chimps and to human toddlers in nearly identical form. Solving the
task earned the chimp or child a treat (usually a piece of food for the chimp,
a small toy for the child). Some of the tasks required thinking only about
physical objects in physical space—for example, using a stick to pull in a
treat that was out of reach, or choosing the dish that had the larger number
of treats in it rather than the smaller number. Across all ten tasks, the
chimps and the two-year-olds did equally well, solving the problems correctly
about 68 percent of the time. But other tasks required collaborating with the
experimenter, or at least recognizing that she intended to share information.
For example, in one task, the experimenter demonstrated how to remove a treat
from a clear tube by poking a hole in the paper that covered one end, and then
she gave an identical tube to the chimp or child. Would the subjects
understand that the experimenter was trying to teach them what to do? In
another task, the experimenter hid the treat under one of two cups and then
tried to show the chimp or child the correct cup (by looking at it or pointing
to it). The kids aced these social challenges, solving them correctly 74
percent of the time. The chimps bombed, solving them just 35 percent of the
time (no better than chance on many of the tasks). According to Tomasello,
human cognition veered away from that of other primates when our ancestors
developed shared intentionality. At some point in the last million years, a
small group of our ancestors developed the ability to share mental
representations of tasks that two or more of them were pursuing together. For
example, while foraging, one person pulls down a branch while the other plucks
the fruit, and they both share the meal. Chimps never do this. Or while
hunting, the pair splits up to approach an animal from both sides. Chimps
sometimes appear to do this, as in the widely reported cases of chimps hunting
colobus monkeys, but Tomasello argues that the chimps are not really working
together. Rather, each chimp is surveying the scene and then taking the action
that seems best to him at that moment. Tomasello notes that these monkey hunts
are the only time that chimps seem to be working together, yet even in these
rare cases they fail to show the signs of real cooperation. They make no
effort to communicate with each other, for example, and they are terrible at
sharing the spoils among the hunters, each of whom must use force to obtain a
share of meat at the end. 227

„Nun steckt im Begriff des Naturrechts auch die Frage nach dem, der es auslegt
— wer bringt die Gesetzestafeln herunter? Ohne Zweifel der Philosoph, und je
großartiger das Naturrecht durch ihn erhöht wird, um so gewaltiger wird die
eigene Rolle.“ 29f

In his book Darwin’s Cathedral, Wilson catalogues the ways that religions have
helped groups cohere, divide labor, work together, and prosper. He shows how
John Calvin developed a strict and demanding form of Christianity that
suppressed free riding and facilitated trust and commerce in sixteenth-century
Geneva. He shows how medieval Judaism created “cultural fortresses that kept
outsiders out and insiders in.” But his most revealing example […] is the case
of water temples among Balinese rice farmers in the centuries before Dutch
colonization. Rice farming is unlike any other kind of agriculture. Rice
farmers must create large irrigated paddies that they can drain and fill at
precise times during the planting cycle. It takes a cast of hundreds. In one
region of Bali, rainwater flows down the side of a high volcano through
rivulets and rivers in the soft volcanic rock. Over several centuries the
Balinese carved hundreds of terraced pools into the mountainside and irrigated
them with an elaborate series of aqueducts and tunnels, some running
underground for more than a kilometer. At the top of the whole system, near
the crest of the volcano, they built an immense temple for the worship of the
Goddess of the Waters. They staffed the temple with twenty-four full-time
priests selected in childhood, and a high priest who was thought to be the
earthly representative of the goddess herself. The lowest level of social
organization was the subak, a group of several extended families that made
decisions democratically. Each subak had its own small temple, with its own
deities, and each subak did the hard work of rice farming more or less
collectively. […] The ingenious religious solution to this problem of social
engineering was to place a small temple at every fork in the irrigation
system. The god in each such temple united all the subaks that were downstream
from it into a community that worshipped that god, thereby helping the subaks
to resolve their disputes more amicably. This arrangement minimized the
cheating and deception that would otherwise flourish in a zero-sum division of
water. The system made it possible for thousands of farmers, spread over
hundreds of square kilometers, to cooperate without the need for central
government, inspectors, and courts. The system worked so efficiently that the
Dutch—who were expert hydrologists themselves—could find little to improve.
288f

„Der kynische Weise nun begab sich in den Naturzustand zurück, in die große
Entlastung von der Verantwortung, und damit in den urnatürlichen Zustand des
Parasitismus. Da er außerhalb von Staat, Geschichte und Geschäften nach
Prinzipien leben mußte, von nichts mehr gehalten, entwickelte er folglich
eine Gesinnung und damit propagandistische Neigungen. Hier fand er wie ein
Rundfunk-Intendant die Motive, um sie den Regierenden ins Ohr zu träufeln. Der
König erhielt seine Aufgabe gestellt, nämlich für die Wohlfahrt der Untertanen
zu sorgen, und dabei ergab sich ganz von selbst die Mission des Philosophen,
der Berater zu sein, der Seelenlenker und Guru. Was jene rücksichtslosen
Troupiers, die dann als Könige und Götter herrschten, sich dabei dachten, ist
schwer zu sagen, doch gab es eine Ideologie, die ihnen interessant erscheinen
mußte: „Der Stifter des Kynismus hatte nämlich dem verderbten Verfassungsleben
seiner Zeit als verlorenes und wiederzugewinnendes Ideal einen seligen
Naturzustand der Urzeit gegenübergestellt, in dem das Volk von den Weisen
geweidet wurde, wie die Schafherde von ihrem Hirten" (H. v. Arnim, Ein
altgriech. Königsideal, 1916, 5). Dieses Motiv bedarf einer angemessenen
Beachtung, es hielt sich sehr lange, und noch Kant sprach im „Streit der
Fakultäten" von der Möglichkeit, daß „Untertanen wie folgsame Schafe, von
einem gütigen und verständigen Herrn geleitet, wohlgefüttert und kräftig
geschützt, über nichts, was ihrer Wohlfahrt abginge, zu klagen hätten". Der
Intellektuelle sucht die Modelle der Herrschaft, an der er teilnehmen will,
auf der Ebene, die seinen Wunschbildern zugänglich ist. Unter der
Voraussetzung der Monarchie und der neuen Natürlichkeit des Geschlagenen bot
sich das Bild des Völkerhirten von selbst an. Dieser Topos verspricht unten
geschützten Frieden, fette Weiden und scherbare Wolle, oben leichtes Regieren.
So bot er das passende Symbol für die kapitale Annahme, die man heute mit den
Worten „Der Mensch ist gut" bezeichnen würde, eine Parole, deren
Wahrheitswert in umgekehrtem Verhältnis zum politischen Kampfwert steht, denn
der Mensch ist nicht gut; er ist auch nicht schlecht, sondern er ist „eine
liquide Masse" (Robert Musil). Eine verharmlosende Anthropologie begegnet uns
überhaupt zuerst bei den Kynikern, sie schloß damals wie heute Klugheit nicht
aus. Der Weise konnte mit solchen Lehren bei der Pazifizierung der
Unterworfenen mit helfen und sich nützlich machen, ja man kann sagen, daß
Antisthenes mit seinem Rückzug aus der Geschichte dem noch unbekannten
Weltherrscher schon vorweg die Übergabe anbot, denn zu seiner Zeit stand erst
der Verlierer, aber noch nicht der letzte Gewinner fest; der Perser galt noch
als Großmacht. Vielen Menschen muß der Topos vom friedlichen Naturzustand des
Grasens sofort und für dauernd eingeleuchtet haben, denn man ließ ihn nicht
wieder fallen, ja in der frühen Stoa machte er einen Hauptpunkt aus. Wir
glauben überhaupt, daß die Stoa zunächst nichts anderes war, als eine
entproletarisierte und womöglich noch bewußter politische Variante des
Kynismus, glauben es im Sinne der Bemerkung des Diogenes Laertius, der in
Antisthenes den „geistigen Urheber der so überaus mann haften Sekte der
Stoiker" sah. Deren Stifter Zenon (geb. um 350) schrieb noch in jungen Jahren
eine Politeia; dort zeichnete er das Bild einer idealen Gesellschaft,
zurückverlegt in jene glückliche Zeit, da die Mensch heit noch nicht in
Staaten und Gemeinden gespalten war. Wie eine friedlich weidende Herde lebten
die Menschen in Eintracht, nur geleitet von dem einen Vernunftgesetz, denn
geschriebene Gesetze brauchte man noch nicht. Es gab übrigens keinerlei
Institutionen, keine Ehe, kein Privateigentum, natürlich auch keine Gerichte,
denn es gab nur gute Menschen, auch standen Mann und Frau einander gleich,
trugen auch äußerlich die selbe Kleidung (M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, 1948, 137).
Da haben wir den guten Menschen in des Wortes schlimmster Bedeutung.“ 14ff

human beings are conditional hive creatures. We have the ability (under
special conditions) to transcend self-interest and lose ourselves (temporarily
and ecstatically) in something larger than ourselves. That ability is what I’m
calling the hive switch. The hive switch, I propose, is a group-related
adaptation that can only be explained “by a theory of between-group
selection,” as Williams said. It cannot be explained by selection at the
individual level. 247

“Modern society is filled with myths perpetuated because of their presumed
value in regard to self-images: that scientists are humble and devoted
truthseekers; that doctors dedicate their lives to alleviation of suffering;
that teachers dedicate their lives to their students; that we are all
basically lawabiding, kind, altruistic souls who place everyone’s interests
before our own; that our country (church, family) is always right and
benevolent and has never done anything with malice or malevolence as a part of
the motivation; that our nation is on the side of right (and we alone sit down
to arms negotiations because of our “good will”); that God is on our side;
etc.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 144)

Joe Henrich, Steve Heine, and Ara Norenzayan published a profoundly important
article titled “The Weirdest People in the World?” The authors pointed out
that nearly all research in psychology is conducted on a very small subset of
the human population: people from cultures that are Western, educated,
industrialized, rich, and democratic (forming the acronym WEIRD). They then
reviewed dozens of studies showing that WEIRD people are statistical outliers;
they are the least typical, least representative people you could study if you
want to make generalizations about human nature. […] The WEIRDer you are, the
more you see a world full of separate objects, rather than relationships. It
has long been reported that Westerners have a more independent and autonomous
concept of the self than do East Asians. […] Westerners, and particularly
Americans, excel at the absolute task, because they saw the line as an
independent object in the first place and stored it separately in memory. East
Asians, in contrast, outperform Americans at the relative task, because they
automatically perceived and remembered the relationship among the parts.
Related to this difference in perception is a difference in thinking style.
Most people think holistically (seeing the whole context and the relationships
among parts), but WEIRD people think more analytically (detaching the focal
object from its context, assigning it to a category, and then assuming that
what’s true about the category is true about the object). Putting this all
together, it makes sense that WEIRD philosophers since Kant and Mill have
mostly generated moral systems that are individualistic, rule-based, and
universalist. That’s the morality you need to govern a society of autonomous
individuals. But when holistic thinkers in a non-WEIRD culture write about
morality, we get something more like the Analects of Confucius, a collection
of aphorisms and anecdotes that can’t be reduced to a single rule. Confucius
talks about a variety of relationship-specific duties and virtues (such as
filial piety and the proper treatment of one’s subordinates). 114f

Darwin’s idea was banished from the academic world when Williams and Dawkins
argued that the free rider problem dooms group selection. The sciences then
entered a three-decade period during which competition between groups was
downplayed and everyone focused on competition among individuals within
groups. Seemingly altruistic acts had to be explained as covert forms of
selfishness. But in recent years new scholarship has emerged that elevates the
role of groups in evolutionary thinking. Natural selection works at multiple
levels simultaneously, sometimes including groups of organisms. 243

Corporations are obligated to maximize profit for shareholders, and that means
looking for any and all opportunities to lower costs, including passing on
costs on to others (when legal) in the form of externalities. 331

„Seit der Antike bezeichnet das Wort ein Gebilde, dessen Sinn letzten Endes
nur als rational organisierte Selbsterhaltung eines geschichtlich irgendwie
zustande gekommenen Zusammenhangs von Territorium und Bevölkerung bestimmt
werden kann. Souverän sind nur solche Staaten, die für sich selbst einstehen
können, denn die Sicherheit eines Staates und seiner Bevölkerung wird nicht
etwa erst durch feindliche Absichten anderer bedroht, sondern bereits durch
mögliche feindliche Absichten, ja nicht etwa nur durch etwas so
Psychologisches wie Absichten, sondern durch objektive Entwicklungen
verschiedenster, meist unvorhersehbarer Art. Wenn diese nur der Dimension oder
Auswirkung nach potentiell gefährlich sind, dann berühren sie schon den
empfindlichen Saum der Sicherheit, mag es sich um Bevölkerungskurven oder
Industriepotentiale handeln, um geographische oder kosmographische
Raumerweiterungen, um Neuerfindungen technischer oder wissenschaftlicher Art
oder was immer. Es ist die bedeutendste geschichtliche Leistung einer Nation,
sich überhaupt als eine so verfaßte geschichtliche Einheit zu halten, und den
Deutschen ist sie nicht geglückt. Die Selbsterhaltung schließt die geistige
Behauptung und das Bekenntnis einer Nation zu sich selbst vor aller Welt
ebenso ein, wie die Sicherheit im großpolitischen Sinne, und diese besteht in
der Macht eines Volkes, den physischen wie den moralischen Angriff auf sich
unmöglich zu machen. Das Bedürfnis nach Sicherheit ist vorpolitischer, ja
vormenschlicher Art, bei gesellig lebenden höheren Tieren gibt es eine
arterhaltend zweckmäßige Verteidigungsreaktion der wehrhaften Exemplare zum
Schutz der Jungen und der tragenden Weibchen, ähnlich wie sehr primitive
menschliche Gruppen für ihr Überleben noch ohne besondere ausgegliederte
Einrichtungen sorgen müssen, die wahrscheinlich zuerst als „Männerhaus" für
den Bund junger Krieger in Erscheinung traten (M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Ges.
616). Die „Souveränität" bewaffneter Sippen hielt sich bekanntlich als
Tatsache oder Anspruch noch lange bis in den schon etablierten Staat hinein,
so bildete ihre Entwaffnung und Domestizierung einen wichtigen Teil der
Feudalgeschichte und des aufsteigenden Königtums, das den potentiellen
Gewaltgebrauch monopolisierte. Infolge der Erweiterbarkeit des Sippenethos
gelang es diesem in der Tat, in hohem Grade die Loyalität, Solidarität und
Pietät der Bevölkerung an sich zu binden. Da die Familien seither wehrlos
sind, haben sie sich in der Frage der Sicherheit gänzlich dem Staat
ausgeliefert, der nunmehr in der Sicherheit seiner selbst und der
Lebensansprüche der Nation die privaten Schutzbedürfnisse mitgarantieren muß.
Das dazugehörige Ethos ist allerdings von dem familiär-humanitären wie dem
eudaimonistischen nicht nur wesensverschieden, sondern dann unverträglich,
wenn die kalte Sprache des Sachzwangs Gehorsam fordert; denn auf den Wegen
jener Formen des Ethos trifft man viele gute Dinge, nur nicht die Sicherheit,
weder die äußere noch die innere, deren letzter Halt Ehrgefühl heißt. Um unter
den Risiken der Sicherheit auf die Dauer zu bestehen, bedarf die Nation
gewisser Tugenden, die alle auf Distanzierung gehen: Der Disziplin und
Nüchternheit, der Wachsamkeit und Ausdauer, der Fähigkeit zur Konzentration
und des rationalen Gefahrensinns — also, mit einem Wort, der politischen
Tugenden. Und sie bedarf auch des Gefühls dafür, welche Gesinnungen und
Parolen solchen Tugenden auf die Dauer gefährlich werden. Dies sind alles
trockene und pathoslose Dinge, und entsprechend hat sich auch Hobbes geäußert
(De Cive 13, 6): „Die Vorteile der Untertanen lassen sich, nur in Bezug auf
das diesseitige Leben, in vier Arten einteilen: 1. daß man gegen äußere Feinde
verteidigt wird; 2. daß der innere Friede erhalten wird; 3. daß man sein
Vermögen, soweit es sich mit der öffentlichen Sicherheit verträgt, vermehren
kann; 4. daß man seine Freiheit so weit genießt, daß daraus kein Schaden
entsteht.“ 100f

“world peace is likely to be achieved only by making it too costly for
aggression to proceed. I have here argued that this is how moral systems have
always operated; the expense of being selfish is why extreme altruism has
prevailed within groups in conjunction with severe extrinsic threats.”
(Alexander, 1987, p. 249)

“The concept of God also implies continuity of social unity—a long-lasting,
intergenerational social contract. If nepotism is our evolved function, then
God (in the sense of vox populi, vox Dei) really can guarantee a reward “in
Heaven,” or after our individual deaths—or a kind of “everlasting life” (for
our genetic materials via our children and other relatives)—as a reward for
moral behavior during life.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 216)

“Humans have taken a route to ultrasociality entirely different from that of
the social insects. In the largest and evidently most unified or stable human
groups (i.e., large, long-lasting nations) partial (rather than complete)
restrictions on reproduction have the effect of leveling or equalizing
opportunities to reproduce. Socially imposed monogamy and graduated-income
taxes are examples of such reproductive opportunity leveling.” (Alexander,
1987, p. 86)

“I do not expect that moral and ethical arguments can ever be finally resolved
because conflicts of interest cannot be finally or ultimately resolved.
Compromises and contracts, then, are (at least currently) the only real
solutions to actual conflicts of interest. This is why moral and ethical
decisions must arise out of decisions of the collective of affected
individuals; there is no single source of right and wrong. I would also argue
against the notion that rationality can be easily employed to produce a world
of humans that self-sacrifice in favor of other humans, not to say nonhuman
animals, plants, and inanimate objects. Declarations of such intentions may
themselves often be the acts of selfinterested persons developing, consciously
or not, a socially self-benefiting view of themselves as extreme altruists. In
this connection it is not irrelevant that the more dissimilar a species or
object is to one’s self the less likely it is to provide a competitive threat
by seeking the same resources. Accordingly, we should not be surprised to find
humans who are highly benevolent toward other species or inanimate objects
(some of which may serve them uncomplainingly), yet relatively hostile and
noncooperative with fellow humans. As Darwin (1871) noted with respect to
dogs, we have selected our domestic animals to return our altruism with
interest.” (Alexander, 1987, p. 202)

„Das, was man den Deutschen nicht verzeiht, ist die mechanische Massentötung
von Wehrlosen im letzten Kriege, aber tiefer gesehen ist das wohl auch in
geistiger Mordversuch gewesen, etwas wie eine kollektive Entwürdigung. Von der
Lüge bis zur Diffamierung geht die Kunst, jemanden geistig wehrlos zu machen.
Die internationale Konvention über die Verhinderung und Unterdrückung des
Verbrechens des Völkermordes vom 9. XII. 1948 hat daher einen geistigen
Völkermord anerkannt, und im Art. II den Begriff „Genocide" unter b) wie folgt
definiert: „Attente grave à l'intégrité physique ou mentale de membres de
groupe" - schwerer Angriff auf die physische oder geistige Integrität einer
Gruppe. Dieser Begriff umfaßt natürlich die Traditionen und Überlieferungen
eines Verbandes ebenso wie seine Ehre, und ein Volk gewaltsam von seiner
Geschichte abzutrennen oder zu entehren bedeutet dasselbe, wie es zu töten.
[...] Und zuletzt: teuflisch ist, wer das Reich der Lüge aufrichtet und andere
Menschen zwingt, in ihm zu leben. Das geht über die Demütigung der geistigen
Abtrennung noch hinaus, dann wird das Reich der verkehrten Welt aufgerichtet,
und der Antichrist trägt die Maske des Erlösers, wie auf Signorellis Fresco in
Orvieto. Der Teufel ist nicht der Töter, er ist Diabolos, der Verleumder, ist
der Gott, in dem die Lüge nicht Feigheit ist, wie im Menschen, sondern
Herrschaft. Er verschüttet den letzten Ausweg der Verzweiflung, die
Erkenntnis, er stiftet das Reich der Verrücktheit, denn es ist Wahnsinn, sich
in der Lüge einzurichten.“ 182

Once early humans had developed spears, anyone could kill a bullying alpha
male. And if you add the ability to communicate with language, and note that
every human society uses language to gossip about moral violations, then it
becomes easy to see how early humans developed the ability to unite in order
to shame, ostracize, or kill anyone whose behavior threatened or simply
annoyed the rest of the group. 192

“In matters of public opinion, citizens seem to be asking themselves not
‘What’s in it for me?’ but rather ‘What’s in it for my group?’ ” Political
opinions function as “badges of social membership.” […] Our politics is
groupish, not selfish. 104f

“we need to subvert these group-specific, seemingly moral tendencies so that
they lead us away from divisions of the world into we and they, friends and
enemies, internally altruistic groups allied against one another. We need them
to lead us instead toward some widely or universally favored and non-dangerous
forms of social compatibility which at least promise to humans as a whole
their perpetuation, individually and as a species; and that also promise,
perhaps, a degree of comfort and pleasure in the pursuit of happiness. We need
to do this because it is group activities that threaten to extinguish our
species, or civilization, and thus threaten us as individuals.” (Alexander,
1987, p. 262)

Western philosophy has been worshipping reason and distrusting the passions
for thousands of years. There’s a direct line running from Plato through
Immanuel Kant to Lawrence Kohlberg. I’ll refer to this worshipful attitude
throughout this book as the rationalist delusion. I call it a delusion because
when a group of people make something sacred, the members of the cult lose the
ability to think clearly about it. Morality binds and blinds. The true
believers produce pious fantasies that don’t match reality, and at some point
somebody comes along to knock the idol off its pedestal. That was Hume’s
project, with his philosophically sacrilegious claim that reason was nothing
but the servant of the passions. 40

“The advantage of this appeal to the goodness of something consists in the
fact that it avoids reference to desire, and, instead, refers to something
impersonal and objective. In this way it seems possible to avoid the
resolution of oblifation into inclination. But just for this reason it is of
the essence of the answer, that, to be effective, it must neither include nor
involve the view that the apprehension of the goodness of anything necessarily
arouses the desire for it. Otherwise the answer resolves itself into a form of
the former answer by substituting desire or inclination for the sense of
obligation, and in this way it loses whal seems its special advantage.” 23

“a dual human nature (i.e., involving both egoistic and altruistic tendencies
or acts) has inconsistency built into it. […] The only time that
utilitarianism (promoting the greatest good to the greatest number) is
predicted by evolutionary theory is when the interests of the group (the
“greatest number”) and the individual coincide, and in such cases
utilitarianism is not really altruistic in either the biologists’ or the
philosophers’ sense of the term. It seems more likely that restraints on
individuals and subgroups serving their own interests occur solely because of
the likelihood of prohibitive costs being imposed by some part of the rest of
society […] Moral philosophers have not treated the beneficence of humans as a
part, somehow, of their selfishness […] If biologists are correct, all that
philosophers refer to as altruistic or utilitarian behavior by individuals
will actually represent either the temporary altruism (phenotypic beneficence
or social investment) of indirect somatic effort or direct and indirect
nepotism. The exceptions are what might be called evolutionary mistakes or
accidents that result in unreciprocated or “genetic” altruism, deleterious to
both the pheno-type and the genotype of the altruist” (Alexander, 1987, p.
106)

„Der berühmte, in Oxford lebende Physikochemiker Michael Polanyi hat in einer
kleinen philosophischen Schrift „Jenseits des Nihilismus" (1961) zuerst von
einer leidenschaftlichen Hinwendung zur Moral gesprochen, die „in unserer Zeit
sich übersteigert hat in ihren maßlosen Forderungen", und er hat behauptet,
daß „das Bedürfnis unserer Zeit umgekehrt darin besteht, unsere maßlosen
moralischen Forderungen einzuschränken, unter denen wir moralisch absinken
müssen".“ 138