📅 Original date posted:2023-09-10
🗒️ Summary of this message: Runes are often bound to the BOLT8 nodeid for protection. The model requires two-way communication for setup but allows for experimentation and extension.
📝 Original message:
Runes today are often bound to the BOLT8 nodeid, giving both (otherwise
you need to protect your rune from being read).

I like this model *but* it requires two-way comms for setup (the HSM
tells the node its id, the node gives the HSM the rune).

Fortunately, it's trivial to support runes as an extension, and set what
the default is if they don't present one.  Allows nice experimentation.

Further discussion on the gist...

Cheers!
Rusty.

Bastien TEINTURIER <bastien at acinq.fr> writes:
> Hey Christian,
>
> You're right, if we create runes inside the HSM then we end up with the
> same security model.
> It then boils down to whether we'd rather implement Bolt 8 or rune
> management inside an HSM!
> I'd prefer Bolt 8, as I think it has more universality (and is simpler),
> but it could be worth experimenting with both approaches.
>
> It will also be interesting to see how we actually configure rights (access
> control) on the lightning node side.
> That really deserves some implementation work to flesh out that kind of
> details.
>
> Cheers,
> Bastien
>
> Le ven. 8 sept. 2023 à 16:51, Christian Decker <decker.christian at gmail.com>
> a écrit :
>
>> Very interesting proposal, though as Will points out we could implement
>> the same using runes: have the rune be managed by the hardware wallet, and
>> commit the rune used to authenticate the RPC call commit to the call's
>> payload. That way a potentially compromised client cannot authenticate
>> arbitrary calls, since the hardware wallet is required to associate a rune
>> with it, giving it a chance for review.
>>
>> This is similar to how authentication of RPC calls works in greenlight,
>> where the node host is not trusted, and we need to pass the authenticated
>> commands forward to the signer for verification before processing any
>> signature request from the node. We chose to authenticate the payload
>> rather than the transport (which is what partonnere does) because it
>> removes the need for a direct connection, and adds flexibility to how we
>> can deliver the commands. Functionally they are very similar however.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Christian
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 7, 2023, 15:06 Bastien TEINTURIER <bastien at acinq.fr> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi William,
>>>
>>> > What is wrong with runes/macaroons for validating and authenticating
>>> > commands?
>>>
>>> Runes/macaroons don't provide any protection if the machine you are
>>> issuing the RPCs from is compromised. The attacker can change the
>>> parameters of your RPC call and your lightning node will still gladly
>>> execute it.
>>>
>>> > I can't imagine validating every RPC request with a hardware
>>> > device and trusted display, unless you have some specific use case in
>>> > mind.
>>>
>>> I think that this is because you have the wrong idea of which RPCs
>>> this is supposed to protect. This is useful for the RPCs that actually
>>> involve paying something (channel open, channel close, pay invoice).
>>> This isn't useful for "read" RPCs (listing channels).
>>>
>>> Making an on-chain operation or paying an invoice is something that is
>>> infrequent enough for the vast majority of nodes that it makes sense
>>> to validate it manually. Also, this is fully configurable: you can
>>> choose which RPCs you want to protect that way and which RPCs you want
>>> to keep open.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Bastien
>>>
>>> Le mer. 6 sept. 2023 à 17:42, William Casarin <jb55 at jb55.com> a écrit :
>>> >
>>> > On Wed, Sep 06, 2023 at 03:32:50AM +0200, Bastien TEINTURIER wrote:
>>> > >Hey Zman,
>>> > >
>>> > >I saw the announcement about the commando plugin, and it was actually
>>> > >one of the reasons I wanted to write up what I had in mind, because
>>> > >while commando also uses a lightning connection to send commands to a
>>> > >lightning node, it was missing what in my opinion is the most important
>>> > >part: having all of Bolt 8 handled by the HSM and validating commands
>>> > >using a trusted display.
>>> >
>>> > What is wrong with runes/macaroons for validating and authenticating
>>> > commands? I can't imagine validating every RPC request with a hardware
>>> > device and trusted display, unless you have some specific use case in
>>> > mind.
>>> >
>>> >         Will
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Lightning-dev mailing list
>>> Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
>>>
>>
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