As I mentioned, there is a non-zero chance Wasabi's systemic address re-use vulnerability will send a mixed output to a previously used change address, that's one reason choosing Wasabi would have been a poor choice. Another is that there is also a non-zero chance that Wasabi's symmetric address reuse vulnerability will include the same address on both the input & output sides of the mix. Additionally, fees paid to Wasabi helped support chain analysis companies; utxos are ground to dust if left to CoinJoin for too long; and now that ZKsnacks' coordinator liquidity has been broken up among several new coordinators, users can enjoy dancing with themselves in shallow liquidity pools that offer no practical anonymity benefits.

Further more, the existence of doxxic change makes no difference when a user is intentionally sending all their outputs to their pre-mix wallet (of all places) and then consolidating them. To even achieve what you've demonstrated the user would have to put in considerable effort to make such a mess of things. 

Your example is one of intentionally destructive user behavior and this entire exercise has demonstrated that you are purposefully attempting to misguide people and/or you have little to no grasp on the subject. Despite your inability to identify that example as a blatantly obvious and intentional maneuver to consolidate outputs, you chose to confidently use it as an example to equate the vulnerabilities in one wallet with the deliberate choices made by the user in another wallet. The fact that you have been engaging in tactics such as this for years is disturbing and the fact that you continue to do so after the Samourai Wallet coordinator has been shut down is deranged.