How China would tackle a second Trump term
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By the spring of 2024, China had settled with the reality that the possibility of a second Trump presidency is not only real, but also significant. According to the national polling organization, by May 22, 2024, former U.S. President Donald Trump has a 0.9% lead to President Joe Biden in the national presidential polls, at 41.1% versus Biden’s 40.2%. The guilty verdict in the criminal trial does not seem to have a major impact over the voters, which still is reflected in a 1.7% percent lead by Trump according to FiveThirtyEight on May 30. The result of the U.S. election is hard to predict and could change in any direction until Election Day. However, it would not be an overstatement to say that Trump has a fair and considerable chance to win. Consequently, Beijing must prepare for potential escalation with the United States on multiple fronts, as well as heightened uncertainty and volatility. The train has left the station long ago on which candidate China prefers. Chinese experts have publicly proclaimed that whoever the winner is, both candidates are “poison” for China. In their view, Biden might bring more stability to bilateral relations, but his competition strategy has been quite effective economically and diplomatically, leaving China’s high-tech industry and diplomatic offensive in limbo. In comparison, Trump’s position on U.S. alliances and partnerships and the damage he might cause serves Beijing’s strategic agenda in the long run. Yet in the short term, Trump’s unpredictability and his use of maximum pressure will put China in extremely difficult corners, making him the less desirable option from China’s perspective. In the current Chinese assessment, a second Trump term will most likely see a tougher U.S. stance on trade and economic relations with China, leading to further decoupling of the two economies. In the foreign policy and security realm, the Chinese have not yet made up their mind on the net result of how a second Trump presidency would affect China. Given Trump’s perceived isolationist tendency and his propensity to measure security ties with allies and partners from an economic cost-benefit perspective, Beijing’s default assumption is that another Trump presidency would seriously undermine U.S. credibility, its alliances and partnerships globally. And that is in China’s interest. China is ready to capitalize on Trump’s isolationist tendency in this regard. Most immediately, the Chinese expect that a second Trump term would lead to the reduction of U.S. security commitment and military aid toward the Ukraine war. China has not firmed up its judgment on which direction a second Trump presidency will push the Taiwan issue toward. Trump complained about Taiwan “taking all of our chip business” in January 2024. And there are some concerns about a remote possibility that under Trump, the United States would abandon Taiwan, which China finds incredible. Beijing recalls vividly how the first Trump term saw some of the most dramatic shifts in U.S. attitudes and positions on Taiwan of the past decades, such as the abrupt lifting of U.S. government rules prohibiting interactions between American and Taiwanese diplomats by then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, a move that according to the Washington Post “amounted to a symbolic but significant upgrade in the U.S. relationship with the democratic island.” China doesn’t believe Trump wanted a war with China over Taiwan, but they do see his indulgence of his team on Taiwan as the result of his overall “maximum pressure” campaign to force China to cave on other fronts, such as trade. If that is true, the United States and China will have more turbulence ahead on Taiwan under a second Trump presidency. Russia is another area of ambiguity. After all, during the first Trump administration, one of Beijing’s top concerns was a rapprochement between Washington and Moscow, leaving Beijing as the odd man out. And if the United States truly sees China as its main long-term strategic threat, one could argue that Washington needs to improve relations with Russia to undermine Chinese-Russian collusion. However, the first Trump term proved that improving relations with Russia was politically infeasible, even for Trump. The Ukraine war has added to the unlikelihood of that scenario, and China-Russia alignment has grown unprecedentedly stronger since 2022. China has limited capability to effectively prevent or counter the China policies of a second Trump term, even if they are against China’s national interests. That is deeply frustrating for Beijing. An alternative, more reassuring interpretation is that China can reduce its dependence on the United States economically and pursue its own parallel world order if Trump returns to the White House. But that is rather a reaction rather than preference. The second takeaway is that much of the modality of Trump’s China policy depends on the composition of Trump’s team, rather than Trump himself. Therefore, Beijing is closely observing who will be on the Trump team and what their China background says about their potential preferences. Chinese interlocutors have made some attempts to reach out to Trump’s team, especially those who work on China, to establish contact and build relations. However, these direct efforts have been more or less shut down by the Chinese government for fear of potential accusations about China’s efforts to interfere in the 2024 elections. Wary of the consequences, Beijing is treading a careful line, particularly because the overt nature of such outreach offers little deniability. As China looks at its playbook on how to tackle a second Trump term, there are two primary takeaways. The first is a painful realization that China has limited capability to effectively prevent or counter the China policies of a second Trump term, even if they are against China’s national interests. That is deeply frustrating for Beijing. An alternative, more reassuring interpretation is that China can reduce its dependence on the United States economically and pursue its own parallel world order if Trump returns to the White House. But that is rather a reaction rather than preference. The second takeaway is that much of the modality of Trump’s China policy depends on the composition of Trump’s team, rather than Trump himself. Therefore, Beijing is closely observing who will be on the Trump team and what their China background says about their potential preferences. Chinese interlocutors have made some attempts to reach out to Trump’s team, especially those who work on China, to establish contact and build relations. However, these direct efforts have been more or less shut down by the Chinese government for fear of potential accusations about China’s efforts to interfere in the 2024 elections. Wary of the consequences, Beijing is treading a careful line, particularly because the overt nature of such outreach offers little deniability. The upshot for 2024 is that China is seeking stability with the Biden administration, and Chinese efforts to build more dialogues, channels, and cooperation are in part to prepare for the potential scenario of another free fall in relations with the United States. In particular, China has been spending much more effort to engage U.S. states at the local level, and to build people-to-people ties at the societal level. Beijing will try to stabilize the relationship and pursue coexistence, should Trump win. But most of all, China is in the mode of bracing for impact on everything from trade to Taiwan, from political ties to diplomatic relations.

#China #Trump #UsElection #TradeWar #ForeignPolicy #Taiwan #Russia

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-china-would-tackle-a-second-trump-term/