> I don’t see how that thread debunks because it assumes a choice between one or the other. Why not both?

So imagine you broadcast OOB to antpool which has 25% of the hashrate. That gives you an estimated average confirmation time of 40 minutes

You have a 25% chance of it being mined in 10 minutes

82.2% chance of it being mined within the hour (1-(1-0.25)^6 = 82.2)

However it could take longer than this. 96.8% chance of it being mined in 2 hours

This vs paying a high enough fee to ensure it gets in the next block. 

Imagine OOB was 25% cheaper than CPFP. Would you wait longer than usual for your transaction to be mined or pay 25% more to ensure it gets in the next block? Also, if it doesn't get in within the hour, would you pay 1.5x the original cost to send it to another miner? 

It seems rational actors will choose just to broadcast.

Also, in practicality, it likely wouldn't be 25% cheaper because every single OOB tx acceleration option I've seen has been substantially more expensive than just doing CPFP. Pools want to charge a premium for this service. 


> I’m not concerned with P2P trading, with primary origination on-chain, or with secondary trading off-chain that happens independently of miners. I think the issue is secondary trading of options directly on chain.

> You can use this to trade options, make atomic swaps, etc.


I suspect you're referring to "decentralized options" from the utxos.org/uses/options page

To clarify, an atomic swap is a purely peer-to-peer contract

And the option contract described on the page is also peer-to-peer.

So it would not be possible for secondary trading of options directly on-chain, unless you knew the counterparties you wanted to trade with ahead of time

You would need to pre-define potential change of ownership of the sell or buy side of the contract, and specify the participants that could take the contract off your hands ahead of time, which leaves no opportunity for MEV

> I think you would need to show that all AMMs must have a fundamental marketplace or contractual state that cannot be modeled by Sapio. It seems to me that if there is any possibility that there could be any secondary on-chain trading, then we can’t rule out the potential for time-based centralizing MEV through arbitrage, front-running, etc.

The key thing with CTV, is you commit to ALL inputs, and ALL outputs

Which means all participants in a CTV commitment or string of CTV commitments, need to be known ahead of time. 

By definition, an AMM needs to allow anyone to participate to take trades in either direction

Not to mention, AMM doesn't work for Runes or BRC20 tokens

There's a proposal for AMMs to work with new OP_CAT tokens, but this doesn't apply at all to CTV: https://x.com/rot13maxi/status/1833667750469804315

So in this regard CTV is extremely safe. It only enables use cases that are peer-to-peer or known-parties-to-known-parties

> MEV already exists elsewhere.

Actually with the point above that you need to specify all the parties ahead of time, I don't think MEV is a concern at all actually

If you can give me a counter-example regarding MEV I'm happy to reconsider

MEV is a concern with runes, because someone can snipe a rune in the mempool when it's being bought

But if you lock into a CTV covenant, only parties specified ahead of time in the CTV commitment can "snipe" or front-run something